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Massacre De Panzos Pdf 18

On 29 May 1978, to pressure the authorities for their land demands and to protest against the abuses of landlords and military and civil authorities, peasants from the settlements of Cahaboncito, Semococh, Rubetzul, Canguachá, Sepacay, Moyagua and La Soledad, decided to protest in downtown Panzós. Hundreds of native men, women and children went to the central square, bringing along their machetes and other agricultural instruments. One of those who participated in the demonstration later recalled: "the idea was not to fight anybody, we only wanted to clarify the land situation. People came from various locations and they did not have firearms with them". [21] That same day, after an unclear provation,[clarification needed] the army massacred the peasants who had gathered peacefully.[22] An unclear number of people died under the fire of machine guns.[23]

Massacre De Panzos Pdf 18

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The studies reviewed below gravitate around two central questions: (1) Who did what to whom? Was the construction of boundaries between perpetrators and victims based on ethnic differentiations, rather than on power and socio-economic status? (2) Did the massacres occur by order of the highest authorities of the State? How voluntary could the obedience to authority be?

That same year, 1983, the book I, Rigoberta Menchú (Burgos-Debray, 1983) brought Guatemalan atrocities to wider attention. A second influential testimonial account was given by guerrilla writer Mario Payeras (EGP comandante Benedicto) in 1983. In Days of the Jungle, Payeras portrayed guerrilla activity as well as violent state responses in the Ixcán region. It is, thus, crucial to recognize that the Guatemalan state terror received international attention. In its reports on the human rights situation in Guatemala, the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights, for instance, provided detailed accounts of massacres carried out in rural parts of the country and noted the increasingly frequent discovery of clandestine cemeteries. (CIDH, 1981, 1983).

In general, however, testimonial accounts have complemented other sources such as quantitative data on massacres. As mentioned above, the second influential testimonial account was written by Mario Payeras, decribing how the guerrillero returns to the jungle, comes to understand the indigenous population and begins once again his revolutionary struggle. Other testimonial accounts and first person tending documents include Montejo (1987), AVANCSO (2002: Vol.II), Harbury (1997), Lovell (2001) and Perera (1993). The ensemble of testimonial accounts brought a special kind of sensitivity to the debate on Guatemalan mass violence. It is crucial to note, however, that some memories and justifications of perpetrators have also been published (for instance, Gramajo Morales, 2003; Krujit/Van Meurs, 2000).

However, there is a need to continue reworking our understanding of the complex patterns of counterinsurgent fervor. It is important to note that the CEH could not prove a genocidal intent directly from military orders. Even though there is evidence to suggest genocidal intentions, the CEH concluded that military plans and manuals (Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo, 1982 [Army], Manual de guerra contrasubvesiva, 1982 [Centro de Estudios Militares], Plan de campaña Victoria 1982 [Army]) do not provide sufficient evidence of genocidal policy. Through an analysis of the pattern of mass atrocities in the four regions mentioned above, the CEH corroborated that a campaign of massacres was carried out during the regimes of Lucas García and Rios Montt. While it is proven that the policy of annihilation was begun by Lucas García and further systematized by Rios Montt (Sanford, 2003: 54), the military command and control structure has not yet been fully explored. And further research is needed to demonstrate the linkages between local conflicts, state institutions, and international actors. It is crucial to recognize that many massacres and killings had local origins (Carmack, 1988: 53-54). According to Bastos (2004: 123), private interests increasingly shaped state institutions, and high-ranking military officers focused on achieving their own goals. The network of power created by land-owners, politicians and military entrepreneurs requires further analysis.

The Franja Transversal del Norte (English: Northern Transversal Strip) is a region in Guatemala delimited to the north by an imaginary line between Vértice de Santiago in Huehuetenango and Modesto Méndez Port in Izabal and in the south by La Mesilla in Huehuetenango and Izabal lake. It is composed, from west to east, of part of the Guatemalan departments of Huehuetenango, Quiché, Alta Verapaz and the entire department of Izabal. It extends roughly 15750 km2.[1] During the Guatemalan Civil War, most of the massacres took place there due to the oil, mineral and precious wood reserves in the region. In the 21st century, there are projects to work in the region and a modern highway was built in 2010.

The US continued to be openly involved in all manner of military operations in Guatemala through to 1978, when official military aid to Guatemala was cut off by US congress after evidence of massacres, rapes, and disappearances by the army became insurmountable. 350c69d7ab


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